PANTHÉON-ASSAS UNIVERSITÉ PARIS

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LEMMA
Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée

SÉMINAIRE

DISCRETE CHOICE UNDER OATHS

05 mars 2024
Lemma - Salle Maurice Desplas 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe 75006 PARIS

Séminaire du Lemma

Le LEMMA organise un séminaire, sur le thème « ***Discrete choice under oaths*** » le mardi 5 mars à 11h.

Nicolas JACQUEMET (PSE – Paris 1)

Résumé :

The Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) remains by far the most popular mechanism used to elicit preferences for non-market goods and services. Yet, the actual reliability of DCE still is questionable. Using an induced value experimental design, we show that standard benchmarks achieve no better than 56 to 60% of payoff-maximizing choices. In this paper, we assess whether a truth-telling oath implemented before the DCE improves the reliability of elicited preferences. Three key findings emerge. First, having respondents voluntarily sign a a truth-telling oath achieves a 50% improvement in payoff-maximizing choices. According to response times data, this is achieved thanks to increased cognitive effort. The induced- value design allow us to directly measure attribute non-attendance. Using this measure, we show this increased cognitive effort induces a significant decrease in attribute non-attendance under oath. Second, based on structural utility models, we show the usual welfare measures inferred from DCE responses are unbiased if and only if respondents were first exposed to the truth-telling oath. Third, we show that the type of oath matters to improved DCE decision making—the commitment to honesty via the truth-telling oath improves choices, whereas an oath to task or an oath to duty did not improve choices.