



SÉMINAIRE

# STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OF NARRATIVES

**08 octobre 2024**

**LEMMA 4 rue Blaise Desgoffe 75006  
Paris**

Le **LEMMA** accueillera **Gerrit BAUCH** lors d'un séminaire de présentation de *Strategic communication of narratives* le mardi 8 octobre, à 11h, en salle Maurice DESPLAS.

Gerrit BAUCH est chercheur postdoctoral à l'Université de Bielefeld. En 2024, il a soutenu sa thèse intitulée *From words of approach to words of departure : essays on noisy communication and partnership dissolution under uncertainty* sous la direction de Frank RIEDEL et Andreas BLUME. Ses intérêts de recherche incluent la théorie des jeux et la théorie de la décision dans l'incertain, ainsi que leur application aux langues et aux dissolutions de partenariats. [Voir ses travaux en cours.](#)

Gerrit BAUCH présentera : *Strategic communication of narratives*, co-écrit avec Manuel FOERSTER

*Abstract : We study the communication of narratives with a receiver who is aware of the strategic incentives of a biased sender. Hereby, a narrative is given by a likelihood function, linking the true state of the world to a publicly observable data set. While the true state of the world is unknown to both agents, the sender is informed about the true data generating process. The sender uses cheap talk messages to influence the receiver's action by providing a narrative aiming at making plausible the observed data in their favor. In this article, the receiver is aware of a finite set of possible narratives and thus the sender's incentives. Equilibrium behavior is studied under a class of decision rules under ambiguity resolving the receiver's ignorance of the true data generating process, including maximum likelihood and maxmin expected utility. If there is an equilibrium that induces  $n$  different actions, there are equilibria that induce exactly  $1, \dots, n-1$  different actions. Under our equilibrium considerations, the diverting power of the sender is weaker than in the naive case.*