Youcef Askoura

Game Theory

• Y. Askoura, and A. Billot, « A probabilistic aggregation rule for large societies », Econ. Theory Bull. (2018), vol 6 n° 2, 251-262.
• Y. Askoura, « On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players », Mathematical Social Sciences 89 (2017), 32-42.
• « An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information », Journal of Mathematical Economics, 58 (2015), 38–45.
• Y. Askoura, M. Sbihi, H. Tikobaini, « The ex ante alpha-core for finite games with uncetainty », Journal of Mathematical Economics, 49 (2013), 157-162.
• Y. Askoura, « The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players », Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47 (2011), 43-47.
• Y. Askoura, J. P. Lebacque and H.Haj-Salem, « Optimal Sub-networks in Traffic Assignment Problem and the Braess Paradox », Computers & Industrial Engineering, 61 (2011), 382-390.
• Y. Askoura, « About extension of upper semicontinuous multi-valued maps and applications », Int. Journal of Math. Analysis, Vol. 3, (2009), no. 15, 739-746.
• Y. Askoura and C. Godet-Thobie, « Continuous selection for multi-valued maps without convexity », Journal of nonlinear and convex analysis, 7 (2006), 299-313.
• Y. Askoura and C. Godet-Thobie, « Fixed points in contractible spaces and convex subsets of topological vector spaces », J. Convex Anal., 13(2006), 193-205.
• Y. Askoura et C. Godet-Thobie, « Fixed point theorem in subsets of topological vector spaces », C. R. Math. Acad. Sci. Paris 340 (2005), 815-818.
• M. Larbani and Y. Askoura, « A concept solution for a strategic cooperative game involving unknown parameters », Game Theory and Applications, Nova Sci. Publ., N.Y., 10 (2005), 97-114.
• Y. Askoura, « Sélections approchées dans les espaces métriques de dimension finie », C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I, 339 (2004), 473-476.
• Y. Askoura, « Existence d'une sélection continue pour les applications multivoques a images non nécessairement convexes », C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I, 337 (2003), 81-83.