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« Stationary Altruism Breeds Time Consistency », A. Billot and X. Qu. Journal of Economic Theory, vol .228, pp. 106-38 (2025)

« Unpaired Kidney Exchange: Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants without Money », M. Akbarpour, J. Combe, Y. He, V. Hiller, R. Shimer and O. Tercieux. Review of Economic Studies, vol 92 (4), pp. 2108-2164 (2025)

We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.

We construct a continuous-time, monetary model with frictional goods and labour markets to revisit the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. By endogenising the value of consumers’ outside options and market power in accordance with standard consumer search theory, we generate novel predictions for the slope of the long-run Phillips curve, optimal monetary policy, and outcomes at the frictionless limit. The relationship between inflation and unemployment is non-monotone and, at low inflation rates, an increase in inflation reduces unemployment. The Friedman rule is suboptimal when firms’ average bargaining power across markets is low. Markups and markdowns vanish as frictions disappear.

We examine the causal effect of a French flu vaccination campaign on vaccination behavior. Individuals aged 65 and over receive an invitation letter with a voucher for a free flu shot, while those who are not eligible have to cover the costs themselves. Using a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that receiving the invitation letter with the voucher leads to a significant increase in the likelihood of getting vaccinated. This effect is driven by individuals who are risk-averse. As illustrated in our theoretical model, for them, the costs of influenza infection outweigh the costs of the vaccine's side effects.